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Abstract  
The following report tries to analyze the impact of the new MiFID II regulation on a sample of 4 
clients’ portfolios of the Credit Suisse International Wealth Management branch in Portugal. This will 
be done with focus on the new product availability to retail clients and considering various scenarios 
of allocation and risk level. The main objective is to deduce how significant will be the impact before 
and after applying the proposed solutions. This was done to help the Relationship Managers to better 
prepare for the challenges rising in 2018. 
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Literature Review – Credit Suisse & 
MiFID II 
MiFID II Impacts in Private Banking 
Three regionally focused divisions and two divisions specializing in investment banking. 
Its Private Banking business offers comprehensive 
advisory services and tailored investment and 
financing solutions to wealthy private clients and 
external asset managers in Europe, the Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America, utilizing 
comprehensive access to the broad spectrum of 
Credit Suisse’s global resources and capabilities as 
well as a wide range of proprietary and third-
party products and services. 
Discretionary Mandates 
Advisory Mandates 














Credit Suisse’s Business Model 
 Suitability & Appropriateness Requirements 
 Appropriateness Required 
 Suitability & Appropriateness Requirements 
Structure 
Product offering & Requirements 
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Sufficient information must be obtained to understand the essential facts about the client in order to assess the suitability of any 
investment advice or service provided.  
The following information is therefore required:  
− Knowledge and experience in relation to the product types provided 
− Financial and other relevant information 
− Risk capacity and risk tolerance 
− Investment objectives/profile particularly investment horizon. 
There may exist necessity for tighter standards for clients who are financially unsophisticated, or lessened suitability standards for those 
clients who are financially sophisticated.  
 
For product Development and approval, the products must be suitable for their target market, this is measured through: 
− Complexity 
− Liquidity limitations 
− Intended method of distribution 
− Potential downside risks 
Proper records must be kept for both advised and non-advised orders. 
There is responsability from employees and supervisors on keeping the requirements above. 
 
Suitability 
Appropriateness (usually for non-advised orders) 
Structure 
Credit Suisse’s Business Model 
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Independent Monitoring of Credit Suisse Investment guidelines and Client guidelines. 
Dynamic Asset Allocation is implemented with attention to diversification, tracking error, volatility analysis, shortfall analysis and stress tests (Market 
Risk). 
Single security level, a set of analysis is made in an ongoing basis: fundamental, technical, liquidity, credit and rating analysis 
Modifications are implemented based on Tactical Asset Allocation changes, changes at the single security level or investment restrictions that were 
reached. 
Product Offering: Discretionary Mandate 
Credit Suisse’s Business Model 
Client Profile 
Strategic Asset Allocation (SAA) 
Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA) 
Risk Monitoring and Reporting 
Construction & Implementation 
 Financial objectives, risk profile and budget, need for liquidity, asset-liability-management and other 
investment restrictions. 
 Benchmark definition (neutral weights, bandwidths, reference indices), best-possible combination of 
(sub) asset classes and Risk Budget is defined.  
 Strategic Allocation (SAA) is also defined with a 5yr horizon. 
 On a 3-6m horizon the CS team actively under/over-weights asset classes and sub-asset classes, regional 
weightings, duration management and currency allocations. 
 Afterwards the allocated Portfolio Manager selects investment instruments and may do it through active 
or passive strategies, tilting, yield curve positioning, adding alpha (stock selection) and opportunistic 
hedging. 
 Ongoing review process: independent monitoring of CS Inv. Guidelines, then Dynamic Allocation.  
 Single security level. 
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Investment proposals with or without specific transaction orders that the client signs. 
Personalized and more active investment strategy, both by the bank and the client. 
The optimal process follows the structure below: 
 
An execution only instruction may involve the provision of information without making any comment or value judgement 
on its relevance to the decisions which an investor may make. 
Whilst no suitability assessment is required for an execution-only trade, if the product is complex an appropriateness 






Product Offering: Advisory Mandate & Execution Only 






Objective Method Result 
Need Analysis 
Wealth Creation/ Liabilities/ Wealth 
Attribution/ Inheritance/ Investments/ 
Pensions/ Taxes 
Determining previously unidentified needs 
and collect additional client data and more 
individually-tailored advice 
Expand relationship & Increase client 
satisfaction 
Financial Concept Balance sheet structure & Timing of 
saving vs speanding 
Estimating potential, identifying assets with 
third-party banks and covering liabilities via 
dedicated assets. 
Expand relationship & Achieve greater 
understanding of client needs 
Client Profile Risk Profile 
Having greater security for clients and 
structured development 
Service Profile: identification of suitable 
services 
Expand relationship & Increased client 
trust 
Strategy Asset allocation, stock picking & timing Presenting a professionally assessed  scenario 
and offering Up-to-date Services 
Increase client satisfaction & increase 
client activity 
Implementation Implement, monitor, adjust & control 
Professional investment proposals 
Regular portfolio analysis 








Clients set-up a life insurance, which in turn opens a policy (inside the insurance company’s account in Credit Suisse).   
Policy portability: the policy holder may open accounts and transfer accounts within banks (that have agreements with the insurance 
company), without losing its characteristics – with the exception of credit lines. Fees are related to outstanding amount, not policy’s 
age. 
The policy works as a surrogate, it is its own collateral, therefore the assets are managed in a segregated way from the insurance’s 
assets. This means that the assets inside the policy do not answer to any of the insurance company’s responsabilities. 
This product may be put into action alongside with any of the mandates presented. 








Credit Suisse’s Business Model 
Fiscal Efficiency 
Fiscal Benefits 
The added value of all assets inserted in the policy capitalizes by its gross value. Meaning that while the policy is not rescued 100% of the 
gains are kept.  
 
Yr0 to Yr5: If policy is rescued there is a small benefit due to the fact that the gains are considered added value and not revenues (different 
taxation system). 
Yr5 to Yr8: Tax exclusion of 20%. 
Yr8 onwards: Tax exclusion of 60%. 
 
Fiscal Aspects of Unit Links 
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The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II is new regulation built on MiFID I, introducing an attempt to harmonize the regulation 
on investment services. 
The 3 main goals for regulators are to i) Improve the quality of advice, ii) Expose and remove conflicts of interest, iii) provide more 
transparency to reduce costs. 
The distributors side is impacted through: 
Competence 
− Demonstrable competence for advisers and information providers. Definition of 
common minimum standards for qualifications and experience that will be required 
of all advisers. 
Inducements 
− Ban on commissions / rebate payments or ‘material’ non-monetary benefits to 
independent advisers or portfolio managers. Non-independent advisers may receive 
inducements subject  to rules on conflicts of interest and not compromising the 
customer. 
Transparency 
− Disclosure of aggregated costs and charges and the costs of advice must be made 
clear to all clients, at the point of investment, annually and both relative as absolute. 
Detailed itemization must also be made available. 
Complexity 
− New definitions of ‘Complex’ and ‘Non-complex’ products. 
Suitability 
− Strengthening of standards on appropriateness of advice and product 
recommendations. Introducing of Target Market Assessment regime. Ongoing 
suitability after-sale. 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
What is MiFID II and why is it here? 
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MiFID II  impacts mostly on 3 dimensions: 
Retail Clients will be restricted on what 
they can buy. 
Only Professional clients will have full 
product availability, retail clients will be 
limited to simple and KID (Key 
Information Document) producing 
products. 
Applicability to European Economic Area 
clients and account holders. 
Clients will have more cost transparency 
(both ex-ante and ex-post).  
Both product costs as bank charges will 
be presented with more clarity. 
This will not only give the client more 
negotiating power with bank and more 
decision power on investments, but it 
will also be the end of retrocessions 
(fees distributors pay banks per each 
product sold through bank). As 
retrocessions will be known to clients 
(ultimate payers of fees), these type of 
agreements between banks and funds 
will cease to exist or reduce 
exponentially. 
There will be a great increase in 
administrative burden with additional 
paperwork such as KIDs, Costs Sheets 
and added Advisory Minutes. 
The information process is explained in 
more detail in the following page. 
Product Availability Pricing Procedures 
How does this apply to Private Banking? 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
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Differences on protection: 
Retail Clients  Highest level of investor protection. 
Professional Clients 
Eligible Clients  Very limited investor protection: Governments and other Financial Institutions 
Client Onboarding Investment Proposal Post Advice Reporting 
Specific Impacts on Credit Suisse 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
New obligations accross the client interaction cycle: 
 Reduced level of investor protection.  
Professional clients per se: Companies 
Eligible professional clients: retail clients that 







Terms & Conditions 





cost & charges. 
Enhance investment 
suitability. Through 










attached with a KID 
and cost sheet. 
Provide loss report 
(>10%, quarterly 
basis), quarterly cost 
and charges report, 
detailed cost and 
charges report (on 
client request), 
enhanced annual cost 
& charges.  
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Methodology & Empirical Results: 
Case Study 
MiFID II Impacts in Private Banking 
MiFID II Impacts in Private Banking 
Explanation of Methodology 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
Sample of 4 different Advisory 
Mandate portfolios 
Comparison between Base Scenario & 
MiFID II Scenarios 
Built the same portfolios as is in a MiFID II scenario – last year performance with and without MiFID II. The two scenarios above will be 
considered. The analysis is made in terms of product availability to retail clients in a MiFID II scenario. 
All abandoned positions relative to the base scenario will be kept as liquidity. 
All abandoned positions relative to the base scenario will be invested in a respective 
risk level Model Portfolio (MiFID II Compliant). 
MiFID II A 







Analysis of Complete Product Choice – which are and aren’t accepted in a MiFID II scenario. 
Create MiFID II Scenarios - for the same time period.  
Construction of Base Scenario 
Analysis of Results 
Each Relationship Manager (RM) chose a random client to simplify clients with only one active account. 
Products were researched and categorized into the following vehicles: FI (Direct Fixed Income), EQ (Direct Equity), FU (Funds) and CA (Cash). 
Even though funds aren’t a class, mostly all in place produce KIDs therefore there was no added value to separate funds by types and classes – 
considering the MiFID II scope of analysis. Furthermore the FI class was subdivided into FI-CONV (Convertible), FI-COCO (Contingent Convertible), 
FI-SR SUB (Senior Subordinate), FI-JR SUB (Junior Subordinate), FI-SR UNSECURED, FI-HYBRID. From these only Senior Unsecured Bonds are out 
of the MiFID II scope and therefore are not required to have a KID available to retail investors.  
Present weights were used for each product as if they had started in November 2016, and considered constant (weights) until to November 2017 
(1year) 
All abandoned positions will be (A) in the current account, (B) invested in a Advisory Model Portfolio with the same risk profile as the client. 
No rebalancing. 
Fees and commisions were ignored. 
14 
Sample Positioning 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
MiFID II does not categorize products in risk, its does so in 
complexity so that the investor may undertake the risk desired 
but requires certains documentations (i.e.KIDs) to ensure full 
understanding of how the products work.  
The biggest challenge for Credit Suisse is to maintain its service 
performance, is the amount invested in direct fixed income – 
where most restrictions lie. This section represents 41,6% of the 
total sample. The biggest section is funds, as mentioned before 
their class is not relevant for an analysis from a MiFID II 
perspective. 
Investments in direct equity (3,9% of the sample) do not have any 
challenges in terms of product availability due to its simple 
nature. 
There are many sophisticated fixed income products that offer 
higher returns with less risk (by being issued by banks), however 
these products are usually very close in nature to equity. These 
products are the ones that become more restricted. 
The liquidity is negative because one of the portfolios in analysis, 
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Convertible Bonds: may be converted into equity at holder’s 
choice. 
CoCo Bonds: may be converted into equity (limited by a 
contingent) at issuer’s choice (banks). This type of product offers 
very high dividends due to the lack of holder’s choice. The 
product is registered as debt in the bank’s balance sheet, 
however if a significant amount of the bank’s clients enter in 
default and rip through the Basel III reserves, the bank can 
exercise the CoCo and convert debt into capital, hence reducing 
its balance sheet and restore the reserve relative levels. 
Inflation Linked Bonds: coupons are linked to an inflation index. 
Alternative Bonds: understood as any other type of bond 
structure (except the plain vanilla – floaters, variables, zero-
coupon…). This category was CS’s interpretation of the directive, 
which makes the following analysis extremely conservative.  
The CoCo Bonds are a branch favourite, amounting to 39,2% of 
all direct fixed income investments. 
 
Fixed Income products in scope with MiFID II 
Some plain vanilla bonds used in the sample have options or swap agreements as collateral, which are products that need a KID in a 
MiFID II scope – therefore this type of products weren’t introduced in the MiFID II scenarios. 
There are some funds that don’t produce KIDs, only factsheets. Therefore these weren’t included in the MIFID II scenarios. 
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The performance of the portfolios observed in the base scenario is a bit higher than the actual performance in the real portfolios (exempt 
fees and taxes) because the real weights on November 2017 were applied in this scenario from November 2016 to November 2017 
unchanged. 
As expected the portfolio with the highest exposure to equity (SRP) performed the best followed by LB. LB’s returns compared to FSP’s, 
both similar in positioning, differ specially due to the FX esposure, FSP has circa 50% of all investments in USD and LB’s investments in US 
curency are only 6% (the EUR/USD had an exceptional increase during the time period considered – USD corrected 9% against the EUR 
between Nov.16 and Nov.17). 
 
Base Scenario 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
The Base Scenario portfolios were built considering the real 
relative positions on the 14th of November 2017.  
All products were included, some were issued few days after the 
beginning of the base portfolio (position was assumed constant – 
no returns – at the initial price on the data missing days). 
Looking through a MiFID II perspective there are two portfolios 
that suggest a more aggressive positioning – FSP and LB – both 
with the highest portion of fixed income hence higher probability 
of product availability changes. SRP shows a balanced positioning, 
MiFID II wise (otherwise it is quite aggressive having >50% 
invested in equities – funds and direct). And finally GVS has the 
most conservative positionnig (again conserning MiFID II 
parameters), since almost 90% of its investments lie on funds – 
typically produce annual or semestral KIDs – not restricted to 
retails clients.  
 
Positioning 
  FSP GVS SRP LB 
Direct Fixed Income 65% 6% 15% 38% 
Direct Equity 0% 0% 29% 0% 
Funds (All classes) 34% 89% 41% 44% 
Cash -40% 5% 15% 0% 
Performance 
  FSP Base GVS Base SRP Base LB Base 
Return 11,15% 7,80% 12,98% 8,95% 
Volatility 1,33% 1,82% 3,70% 1,85% 
FX Impact -7,51% -2,12% -3,85% -0,59% 
TOTAL 3,64% 5,68% 9,13% 8,36% 
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Reflecting the RM’s skills, the volatility of all portfolio’s has changed but not very significantly (below 1%) – meaning that the investments 
that are not MiFID II available and that were previously invested in the portfolios, were having a significant impact in the portfolio’s 
returns but had less impact in terms of volatility. Even though one’s expectations is that the volatility would decrease due to the MiFID II 
constraints, GVS’s volatility increased by 20bp, this can be explained by extracting hedge purposed products.  
This scenario reflects the worse possible loss in terms of performance due to MiFID II restrictions. 
MiFID II - A 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
This scenario considers that the amount invested in MiFID II 
unavailable products in the Base Scenario, will now stay in the 
current account as liquidity (in their respective currency). 
As anticipated previously, the portfolios with most exposure to 
fixed income were the ones that suffered the biggest changes in 
positioning. FSP’s direct investments in Fixed Income are 50% 
lower than in the Base Scenario. Half of these 50% are 
Subordinated Bonds (Jr. and Sr.), approximately 40% are Cocos 
and the rest are Hybrids and Convertibles.  Similarly LB’s 33% 
Fixed Income change is 60% due to Cocos and 20% to Hybrids. 
Performance wise, FSP and LB suffered the biggest lost due to the 
high returns from Cocos. As GVS is mainly composed of funds the 
return impact is very little. SRP’s negative return impact comes 
from the fact that half of the small amount of fixed income in the 
base scenario (approximately 15%) is not available in a MiFID II 
compliant scenario. 
Positioning 
  FSP ∆ GVS ∆ SRP ∆ LB ∆ 
Direct Fixed Income 13% -52% 3% -3% 8% -7% 5% -33% 
Direct Equity 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 0% 0% 
Funds (All classes) 34% 0% 89% 0% 32% -9% 44% 0% 
Cash 12% 52% 8% 3% 31% 16% 33% 33% 
Performance 
  FSP ∆ GVS ∆ SRP ∆ LB ∆ 
Return 2,21% -8,9% 7,50% -0,3% 9,96% -3,0% 4,53% -4,4% 
Volatility 0,59% -0,7% 2,05% 0,2% 3,39% -0,3% 1,11% -0,7% 
FX Impact -7,51% 0,0% -2,12% 0,0% -3,85% 0,0% -0,59% 0,0% 
TOTAL -5,30% -8,9% 5,38% -0,3% 6,11% -3,0% 3,94% -4,4% 
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The results of the performance do not represent the worst case scenario because the clients in analysis have a high risk profile.  
Due to the high risk profiles, the decrease in returns in this scenario is smaller than the one in the A scenario. Consequently the  half of 
the volatilities increased, even compared with the base scenario which is a very alarming indicator for the following year. This fact once 
again reflects the added value of the Advisory process. SRP did not increase volatility due to its already high volatility base, therefore a 
more conservative portfolio addition reduced volatility. On the same trend LB also decreased volatility due to removing the high volatile 
products unavailable in MiFID II scenario. 
GVS’s performance show the smallest reduction in returns of 10bp as its portfolio changes very little, only suffers a replacement of 3% of 
Fixed Income by Equity. 
MiFID II - B 
This scenario considers that the amount invested in MiFID II 
unavailable products in the Base Scenario is now invested in a 
MiFID II compliant CS Advisory model portfolio with the same risk 
profile as the client. 
The positioning in this scenario is very similar to the one in the A 
scenario except with the addition of the model portfolios. These 
portfolios are mainly invested in funds, logically the most 
aggressive ones are invested directly in Equities. Therefore these 
are MiFID II compliant, this meaning that as they’re invested in 
funds (most produce KIDs) and in direct Equities (do not need 
KIDs) there is not nay restrictions. 
The clients can be categorized in 5 different levels of risk profile. 
These risks levels are crucial and limit portfolio strategies and 
investment picking.  
On the discretionary mandates, the bank manages the 
adjustment to the risk levels through 5 different model portfolios. 
The risk increase from level 1 up to 5 comes from assets class 
reallocation, namely from adding direct equity. 
 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
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Performance 
  FSP ∆ GVS ∆ SRP ∆ LB ∆ 
Return 8,03% -3,1% 7,75% -0,1% 10,80% -2,2% 7,16% -1,8% 
Volatility 2,99% 1,7% 2,00% 0,2% 2,99% -0,7% 1,64% -0,2% 
FX Impact -5,84% 1,7% -1,93% 0,2% -3,74% 0,1% -1,32% -0,7% 
TOTAL 2,19% -1,4% 5,82% 0,1% 7,06% -2,1% 5,85% -2,5% 
Positioning 
  FSP ∆ GVS ∆ SRP ∆ LB ∆ 
Direct Fixed Income 13% -52% 3% -3% 8% -7% 5% -33% 
Direct Equity 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 0% 0% 
Funds (All classes) 34% 0% 89% 0% 32% -9% 44% 0% 
Cash -40% 0% 5% 0% 15% 0% 0% 0% 
Model Portfolio 52% 52% 3% 3% 16% 16% 33% 33% 
The graph and tables on the right show the different returns for 
each portfolio for the 5 risk levels and their respective volatility. 
This always taking into consideration the base portfolios in the 
MiFID II – B scenario.  
The 5 portfolios are the bank’s model for the advisory process 
for each type of client profile. The portfolio 1 is the Fixed 
Income portfolio that is adjacent to the lowest risk profile, and 
so it goes until portfolio number 5 – the highest risk level profile 
with approximately 85% invested in equity.. 
There is a big increase in returns from model portfolio 1 to 2 
due to allocating 27% of fixed income to equities. 
It is important to note that as the period in observation was very 
peculiar terms of FX results, 2017 was an extremely negative 





Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 


















1 2 3 4 5
MiFID II - B & 5 Risk Level Portfolios Return 
FSP GVS SRP LB
Ret. FSP GVS SRP LB Vol. FSP GVS SRP LB 
1 -2,2% 5,5% 5,7% 3,8% 1 0,65% 1,99% 2,85% 0,85% 
2 -0,3% 5,7% 6,3% 5,0% 2 1,24% 1,99% 2,87% 1,08% 
3 0,5% 5,7% 6,5% 5,5% 3 1,72% 1,99% 2,89% 1,31% 
4 1,1% 5,8% 6,7% 5,8% 4 2,33% 1,99% 2,93% 1,64% 
5 2,2% 5,8% 7,1% 6,5% 5 2,99% 2,00% 2,99% 2,02% 
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Risk Scenarios: Considering different client profiles 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
It is clear that the top performer from the Base Scenario stay at 
the top, SRP. Due to the high return base of a portfolio 
constructed from mainly Equity. GVS is very stable across risk 
levels it suffers little changes. LB’s on the other hand suffers a 
reallocation of 33% representing 61% of its returns. This portfolio 
presents the biggest return reduction in every risk level. LB’s base 
portfolio consisted in 100% fixed income and was constructed 
with great detail to manage risk, meaning that there were many 
high return products combined with low volatility ones. As the 
MiFID II scenario comes, specially in higher risks level, the high 
return products are replaced with lower returns products but the 
volatility is not compensated.  
Through FSP’s performance on the graph, one can follow the 
direct trend of the Model Portfolios across the risk levels, since 
FSP suffered the largest reallocation of 52% of its assets - which 
represented 80% of its return. As FSP FX Impact is very negative – 
it is leveraged in EUR, in the lowest levels of risk the results are 
actually negative.  
The most alarming information suggested from this analysis is 
that in whatever risk level the clients are, the returns decrease 
substantially and the volatility increases on some cases – 
therefore the MiFID II ambition to increase client protection 












1 2 3 4 5
MiFID II - B & 5 Risk Level Portfolios Return 
FSP GVS SRP LB
Ret. FSP GVS SRP LB Vol. FSP GVS SRP LB 
1 -2,2% 5,5% 5,7% 3,8% 1 0,65% 1,99% 2,85% 0,85% 
2 -0,3% 5,7% 6,3% 5,0% 2 1,24% 1,99% 2,87% 1,08% 
3 0,5% 5,7% 6,5% 5,5% 3 1,72% 1,99% 2,89% 1,31% 
4 1,1% 5,8% 6,7% 5,8% 4 2,33% 1,99% 2,93% 1,64% 
5 2,2% 5,8% 7,1% 6,5% 5 2,99% 2,00% 2,99% 2,02% 
The right chart shows a more complete 
representation of the results presented on 
the previous slides, it shows the map of 
returns, volatility, risk level and portfolios 
under the MiFID II-B scenario.  
The most striking information that is so 
clearly presented on this chart is overall 
reduction in returns. The volatilities are even 
more intriguing. GVS’ volatility is slightly 
higher than the base, in any risk scenario 
considered. FSP’s depend highly on the risk 
scenario – 1&2 volatilities’ are lower and 
3,4&5 they’re higher. On the other hand 
both SRP and LB reduce volatility in any 
MiFID II scenario. Both Lb and SRP are very 
peculiar portfolio as one is almost all equity 
and the other consists in 100% of Fixed 
Income. 
From this we can conclude that the majority 
of the bank’s portfolios, which in Portugal 
mostly are situated in risk levels 3 and 4, will 
diminish in return and increase in volatility. 
Again concluding that for a regulation that 
aims to protect clients the conclusion in 
terms of volatility is disturbing. 
 
Sample Portfolios in MiFID II 
Risk Scenarios: Lower returns & higher volatility 
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To further analyse if these MiFID II impacts are significant throughout the whole bank, a sample of 20 portfolios was studied. It was 
extracted from the most used listed risk level in the Portuguese branch: Risk Level 4. it is listed risk level due to the fact that most of the 
clients are inserted in a different category of bespoke strategies, meaning that they are not limited by risk levels, therefore the most usual 
listed level was used to be able to achieve sound comparisons. The scenario B was considered, every amount that was released from non 
compliant MiFID II products was invested in a Advisory Model Portfolio with risk level 4. 
It is also important to mention that the first sample that was analysed in such detail was mostly clients of risk level 5 – which was the RM’s 
choice when asked to provide a random portfolio for the study. 
In order to conclude if the higher volatility and lower returns hypothesis is significant in the population, a less detailed process of the one 
described above (in methodology) was put into action on the 20 portfolio sample and the changes both in the standard deviation as in the 
returns were tested with a t-test, Ho: average changes in return/volatility = 0 and Ha: average changes in return/volatility ≠ 0. To this 





For the changes in returns the t-value observed was -1,004. Which compared with the t-student distribution’s critical values for 95% 
confidence interval and 19 degrees of freedom (±2,093), the null hypothesis is not rejected and therefore the changes are not significant.  
For the changes in volatility, in the MiFID II scenario considered, a t-value of -1,43 was obtained, which again, comparing with the critical 
values for the same distribution one must conclude that the changes are not significant. 
This statistical analysis may not be accurate due to possibility for biased sample, as there are many portfolios categorized as following a 
bespoke strategy that may have the same risk level e suffer more from MiFID II than the categorized in risk level 4 ones. This is also very 
probable as the RM’s prefer to have flexibility to invest in riskier products for some clients and therefore insert them in bespoke strategy. 
Furthermore the sample is very small considering the universe of 500 portfolios. Nevertheless if the result of insignificance is accurate it is 
very assuring for the bank. 
Statistical Significance of MiFID II Impacts 
Are these impacts significant? 
23 
Conclusions 
MiFID II Impacts in Private Banking 
Overall the MiFID II will have a negative impact on performance, by restricting the products available the most diverse and high return 
products are off limits which as seen above have great impact in overall performance. There is also the cost issue that was not studied 
due to unavailability of information. Nevertheless this will prove a challenge to the RMs in the sense of explaining to the clients why 
the whole costs were never fully presented– specially on the retrocessions matter.  Both in the individual and the statistical 
significance analysis there were products that could not have been included in the returns on the base scenario, as private equities 
and trusts that are not quoted privately or in Bloomberg terminals. These specific investments have not been included at all but they 
would represent a significant difference in returns as their investment was kept in the portfolios but with zero returns. 
Retrocessions are fees that the bank receives from funds for each investment made through the bank (included in the fund’s 
management fees paid by client), their usually between 0.25% to 0.60% - which is a considerable amount. The biggest problem with 
the costs is that the clients do not have an idea how much they are paying, the returns do not change – the costs are taken directly 
from the returns the funds gives away, for example the client receives 5% return in a year from a fund, but does not know that it was 
7-8% before the fees were charged, furthermore they do not know that a part of these fund’s costs are profit for the bank. 
Another great challenge will be the increase in bureaucracy. There are many new documents that must be delivered and signed to and 
by the client. Moreover this will be integrated in a more complex  and long interactions between RM and clients, for every trade idea 
the client must be in possession of the simplified cost sheet and KID if necessary. For the execution there must be proof the client has 
received and understand the cost sheet and KID, afterwards the client must receive the detailed cost sheet (of the specific trade) and 
the advisory minutes. 
On a more personal note, this project and internship gave me a great insight on the financial institutions system. It is clear that there 
have been many changes in structure and process for these type of banks after the 2008 crisis, and these are still happening. Although 
many changes limit the flexibility and creativity of the financial market to create and find profit, on the other hand one hopes they 
protect the market and their inhabitants. 
There was also a big exposure to the commercial part of the job. This was both interesting and reassuring, as communicating with the 
clients not only helps maintain the human part of the job, but also, in my opinion, keeps the bankers grounded – meaning that 
materializes the fact that the money dealt with every day is not only a vehicle for fees and commissions but has actual people 
depending on it. 
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Conclusions & Personal Notes 
It is expected that the market itself will respond to MiFID II according to the bank’s best interests, by this it is meant that the distributors 
will have to give into market pressure and allocate resources to producing KIDs in order to maintain their sales’ level if these are affected 
by the regulation. 
There is also the choice of bumping-up retail clients to professionals. Or creating unit links. To set a client as professional, this must have 2 
out 3 of the bank’s demands: the client has carried out transactions of significant size at an average frequency of 10 per quarter over the 
previous 4 quarters; the size of the client’s portfolio exceeds EUR 500k; the client works/has worked in the financial sector for at least 1 
year in a professional position, which requires knowledge of the transactions. The latter point is not very common, which creates 
incentives to increase transaction numbers on the retail portfolios. On the other hand the unit links may be an excellent solution – even 
without the MiFID II problem as it was seen before, with the only set back of long term horizon.  
Finally the most important solution for the changes to come in 2018 is the adaptability of the RMs’ strategies and their capacity to explain 
to the clients that the contraction of performance is absolute but not relative, as every player in the market will be affected similarly. 
Solutions & Further Research 
Proposed Solutions 
A big flaw in MiFID II is that the clients may invest in mutual funds that have positions in products that don’t comply with the complexity 
level required per client. Further research on specific mutual funds of structured products may reduce the returns impact. 
There is an opportunity of deep analysis of costs that will influence negatively the bank, and positively the clients – they will gain power of 
negotiation due to the introduced transparency – both in costs and retrocessions 
The statistical significance analysis could be made for all risk levels and extended to bespoke strategies in order to better understand the 
regulation’s impacts.  
Further Research 
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